Abstract:

Bruce Baum offers a serious response to Joel Olson’s radical call for the abolition of white racial identity and for American democracy to “aspire to blackness.” Providing both critical commentary and praise for Olson’s critique of the colorblind and multi-cultural ideals, Baum largely shares Olson’s diagnosis for the root causes of racial injustice in contemporary American society. But while Baum shares Olson’s understanding of how we got here, his solution is slightly different than what Olson has proposed. Though he does not completely reject Olson’s call for an abolitionist personality, Baum argues that a critical theory of racialized identity is a more effective means by which to cultivate the anti-racist democratic identities and institutions that both he and Olson so passionately believe are necessary to rescue American society from its long legacy of racial injustice.

THE WHITENESS PROBLEM IN “COLORBLIND” AND MULTICULTURAL POLICY: A RESPONSE TO JOEL OLSON

Bruce Baum*

At the end of his influential 1963 book, The Fire Next Time, James Baldwin says, “Color is not a human or a personal reality; it is a political reality. But this is a distinction so extremely hard to make that the West has not been able to make it yet.”1 Focusing on the case of the United States, Baldwin is emphatic that white supremacism has been the source of the racial mystification and terror, advantage and degradation, that have marked the country’s history. White people, he says, “are, in effect, still trapped in a history which they do not understand; and until they understand it, they cannot be released from it. They have had to believe for many years, and for innumerable reasons, that black men are inferior to white men. Many of them, indeed, know better, but . . . people find it very difficult to act on what they know.”2

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* Bruce Baum received his B.A. from Vanderbilt and his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Minnesota. He is currently teaching at Macalester College and is the author of the books Rereading Power and Freedom in J.S. Mill and The Rise and Fall of the “Caucasian Race”: Genealogy of a “Race” Concept. Mr. Baum is presently editing a volume on race and transformation of the American identity.


2 Id., 22-23.
Baldwin uses his critical acumen mainly to highlight the great social, economic, political, and psychic tolls that white people have inflicted on themselves and others by vigorously asserting and guarding their whiteness. But he also suggests a way for whites to become part of the solution rather than remain the root of the problem:

White Americans find it as difficult as white people elsewhere do to divest themselves of the notion that they are in possession of some intrinsic value that black people need, or want. . . . The white man’s unadmitted — and apparently, to him, unspeakable — private fears and longings are projected onto the Negro. The only way he can be released from the Negro’s tyrannical [psychic] power over him is to consent, in effect, to become black himself, to become a part of that suffering and dancing country that he now watches wistfully from the heights of his lonely power and, armed with spiritual traveler’s checks, visits surreptitiously after dark.³

Baldwin’s recommendations foreshadow Joel Olson’s compelling call for the abolition of white racial identity and for U.S. democracy to “aspire to blackness.”⁴ Olson outlines these ideas in the course of his powerful critique of competing approaches to the “political reality” of racialized conceptions of personhood: the colorblind ideal and the multicultural ideal.⁵ As Olson explains, it is precisely because “race is a political reality and not a biological reality that colorblind and multicultural policies are inadequate to overcome racialized oppression and injustice.

Olson’s critique of the colorblind and multicultural ideals includes two crucial insights for our efforts to overcome the “American dilemma” of racial injustice. First, he explains that the “colorblind ideology naturalizes white advantage, shifting the blame for persistent racial gaps on Black people and excusing whites almost completely.”⁶ Second, he points out that the multicultural ideal, which seeks to establish equal recognition in the public sphere for distinct cultural groups, is inappropriate for the politics of “race” because “race is not a form of culture but a form of power.”⁷ Olson elaborates this crucial point by examining the problematic way that multiculturalism has been deployed in the new field of “whiteness studies.” Some of this scholarship, he notes, has sought

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³ Id., 108, 110.


⁶ Olson, supra note 4, at 9.

⁷ Id. at 13.
inappropriately to reconceptualize whiteness as a cultural rather than racial identity to secure for “white identity deserves a place at the multicultural table.”

I find the main lines of Olson’s critique of colorblind and multicultural approaches to racialized injustice thoroughly compelling. I contend, however, that the problems Olson identifies call for a slightly different understanding than he provides of the interplay of power and culture in the production of racialized identities. Olson rightly insists that racialized identities — as distinct from ethnic or cultural identities — are primarily a manifestation of unequal power between groups rather than a matter of cultural diversity. Nonetheless, racialized identities have significant cultural dimensions that beg to be more fully theorized. Racialized identities give rise to diverse cultural practices and modes of self-definition — ranging, for example, from white supremacism to more subtle proprietary assertions of whiteness to Black nationalism and other oppositional nationalisms. Therefore, an anti-racist, democratic politics that seeks to affirm the moral equality of all human beings as human beings must not simply reject or endorse all the diverse cultural manifestations of racialized identity. Instead, such a politics demands a critical theory of racialized identity. The guiding principle of this theory is that we should support positive public recognition only for those cultural manifestations of racialized identity that, in Nancy Fraser’s words, “can be coherently combined with the social politics of equality.”

A critical theory of racialized identity, I contend, confirms Olson’s insights about the antidemocratic character of white racialized identity. At the same time, it offers more qualified support for his call to cultivate an abolitionist personality and his suggestion that “democracy should aspire to blackness”.

I. THE PROBLEM OF WHITENESS

Olson builds on recent critical studies of whiteness to illuminate the limitations of colorblind and multicultural policy approaches. Neither, he says, constructs “a truly democratic alternative to racist conceptions of personhood because neither addresses the problem of white identity.” In this regard, both ideals are power-evasive. The

8 Id. at 14; It should be noted that Olson himself is contributing to the branch of “whiteness studies” — called “critical studies of whiteness” or “critical white studies” — that avoids this error by critiquing whiteness. See also CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).

9 I speak of racialized identities to emphasize the politically constructed character of “race.”


12 Olson, supra note 4, at 3, 17–19.

13 Id. at 20.

14 Id. at 3.
colorblind approach acknowledges the non-reality of biological “race” only to deny its continuing political salience. Thus, while the colorblind ideal is certainly an advance over expressly racist theories that construe the so-called “races” as inherently different and unequal, it in effect perpetuates the material inequalities that have been produced by the historical and current inequalities of racialized status.\(^{16}\)

As Olson makes clear, the role of power in the construction and perpetuation of racialized identities becomes evident when we consider whiteness. Recent work by Cheryl Harris and George Lipsitz is especially helpful here. Harris persuasively leads us away from the erroneous view that either “race” is biological reality or it has no reality at all by explaining how white racialized identity, or whiteness, operates as a form of property;\(^{17}\) and, in a similar vein, George Lipsitz speaks of a “possessive investment in whiteness” among whites.\(^{18}\) The basic point is that racialized whiteness operates as a property interest in the United States because it yields material benefits or dividends (e.g., superior educational opportunities, employment networks, income, and wealth accumulation) to those people who get themselves counted as white only as long as it is maintained as an exclusive possession.\(^{19}\) Moreover, whiteness has served to distribute these benefits to white people across class lines in a way that has partially obscured class-based inequalities among whites and, thus, has significantly undermined opportunities for both class-based and anti-racist redistributive politics.\(^{20}\)

Lipsitz explains: “This whiteness is, of course, a delusion, a scientific and cultural fiction that like all racial identities has no valid foundation in biology or anthropology.” At the same time, it is “a social fact, an identity created and continued with all-too-real consequences for the distribution of wealth, prestige, and opportunity.”\(^{21}\) Harris adds that from its beginnings “the concept of whiteness was premised on white supremacy rather than on mere difference. ‘White’ was defined and constructed in ways that increased its value by reinforcing its exclusivity.”\(^{22}\) She notes that while these features of whiteness

\(^{15}\) Frankenburg, supra note 5, at 147.
\(^{16}\) Olson, supra note 4, at 4–6.
\(^{17}\) Cheryl I. Harris, *Whiteness as Property*, in *CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT* 277 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et. al. eds., 1995).
\(^{19}\) In Lipsitz’s useful summary, the dividends that this property interest in whiteness pays to “white” people include the following:

. . .advantages that come to individuals through profits made from housing secured in discriminatory markets, through unequal education allocated to children of different races, through insider networks that channel employment opportunities to relatives and friends of those who have profited most from present and past racial discrimination, and especially through intergenerational transfers of wealth that pass on the spoils of discrimination to succeeding generations.

*Id.* at vii.

\(^{21}\) Lipsitz, supra note 18, at vii.
\(^{22}\) Harris, supra note 17, at 283.
were most strikingly evident in the United States in the eras of most rigid racial hierarchy — i.e., the eras of slavery, Manifest Destiny, and Jim Crow segregation — the character of whiteness as a lucrative property interest has persisted in more subtle forms. In the wake of the Civil Rights Movement, the government now appears to treat all citizens as equal before the law. Yet insofar as law and public policy pursue equality by treating all citizens the same, despite their different racialized identities, they work to sustain the social and economic inequalities that have been produced by white supremacy and more subtle forms of white privilege:

Because the law recognized and protected expectations grounded in white privilege (albeit not explicitly in all instances), these expectations became tantamount to property that could not permissibly be intruded upon without consent. As the law explicitly ratified those expectations . . . by failing to expose or to disturb them radically, the dominant and subordinate positions within the racial hierarchy were reified in law. When the law recognizes, either implicitly or explicitly, the settled expectations of whites built on the privileges and benefits produced by white supremacy, it acknowledges and reinforces a property interest in whiteness that reproduces black subordination.23

The problem of racialized identity in general and of white racialized identity in particular, then, is evaded by both colorblind and multicultural policies. Proponents of colorblind policy present it as egalitarian and democratic, yet it undercuts true equality of opportunity and substantive democracy by de-legitimating the kinds of “race”-conscious policies that offer a means to achieve these ends, such as affirmative action or reparations.24

Likewise, multiculturalism fails to confront adequately the problem of racialized injustice. Advocates of multiculturalism present it as an egalitarian and democratic response to the problem of group differences because it by promotes equal public recognition for all different cultural groups. By itself, however, it fails to promote democratic equality with respect to racialized groups because “race” is primarily a matter of domination and subordination, advantage and disadvantage, and only secondarily a matter of cultural diversity.25 Accordingly, overcoming racialized injustice requires not equal recognition for different cultures, but dismantling racialized hierarchies.

In this light, Olson’s critical examination of white racialized identity illuminates significant tensions between anti-racist and multicultural approaches to group difference. He tellingly discusses the anguished efforts of some scholars of whiteness, such as Henry Giroux, to recuperate white racial identity positively as something other that a racist

23 Harris, supra note 17, at 281; Cf. Olson, supra note 4, at 4–6, 9–10; and Lipsitz, supra note 18, at chap. 1.
24 As Harris says, affirmative action offers promise in this regard because it “denies the privileges of whiteness and seeks to remove the legal protections of the existing hierarchy spawned by race oppression.” Harris, supra note 17, at 288. The same can be said, I would argue, for reparations.
identity that perpetuates racial domination — indeed, to recover it as a potentially progressive, anti-racist identity.\textsuperscript{26}

In our age of identity politics, the efforts by Giroux and others to reconstruct whiteness are understandable, but still deeply flawed. They speak to people’s variegated efforts find sources of meaning, purpose, self-definition, and affiliation in and through their social identities.\textsuperscript{27} Thus George Yúdice suggests, “Whites must feel that they have a stake in the politics of multiculturalism and not simply see themselves as a backdrop against which subordinated groups take on their identity.”\textsuperscript{28} The difficulty here is that insofar as racialized identities persist, their character as cultural modes of self-identification, affiliation, and self-expression is evident in various ways, many of which cannot be coherently combined with a basic commitment to the moral equality of all persons. For instance, cultural dimensions of racialized identity can be found among racialized groups whose cultural practices challenge racist cultural norms by positively re-valORIZING previously demeaned “racial” identities — e.g., in the Black nationalist assertion that “Black is Beautiful.” Yet they are also evident among in the cultural norms and practices of groups that enact racist identities, such as white supremacism, as well as in more subtle cultural assertions or evasions of racial privilege by dominant groups.

This, of course, is precisely the kind of asymmetry that leaves many whites feeling rootless in an era of identity politics and, then, striving to rehabilitate whiteness in a benign if not anti-racist form.\textsuperscript{29} In the end, however, whiteness as whiteness — something distinct from the various ethnicities that have been folded into it — remains a problem: it is difficult (if not impossible) to grasp just what whiteness might mean or signify other than being an assertion of white supremacy or a defense of more subtle forms of white privilege. That is, it is one thing for people to identify themselves as Irish Catholics or English Protestants or Italian- or Jewish- or Egyptian-Americans, even if these identities are not unproblematic; it is quite another thing for people to identify themselves or their culture as white. In Olson’s terms, the former designations are not necessarily forms of status and subordination, but the assertion of whiteness intrinsically constitutes forms of status and subordination.\textsuperscript{30} Therefore, insofar as we can identify white culture — i.e., the cultural practices and manifestations of white racialized identity — it seems to have no content other than sum of the exclusionary norms, values, and practices that define “whiteness” and distinguish it from that which is not-white.

\textsuperscript{26} Olson, supra note 4, at 14–16.


\textsuperscript{29} Frankenburg comments that the troubling history of whiteness “produces a discursive bind for … [those] white women and men concerned to engage in antiracist work: if whiteness is emptied of any content other than that which is associated with racism or capitalism, this leaves progressive whites apparently without a genealogy.” FRANKENBERG, supra note 5, at 232; Cf. Yúdice, supra note 28, at 259-75.

\textsuperscript{30} See Olson, supra note 4, at 14.
With these considerations in mind, Olson contends, “[t]he task of a democratic politics . . . is not to ignore nor redefine white personhood, but to abolish it.” 31 This requires the cultivation among whites of an abolitionist personality that would be “resolutely opposed to white privileges of any kind.” 32 This notion, I believe, definitely points us in the right direction to develop new forms of identity that would support a truly democratic society. With that said, however, I see one difficulty with the abolitionist idea. As Olson says, the task of overcoming racialized inequalities requires those persons who benefit from white privilege to support “race”-conscious redistributive policies, such as affirmative action and reparations, for groups that have been defined as not-white. Yet this requires that whites learn to dis-identify with whiteness in a way that is more ambivalent than the abolitionist ideal suggests. It calls for a deconstructive and strategic rearticulation of whiteness by anti-racist “whites,” for as long as “race,” racialized inequality, and white privilege persist, as a way to bring about its abolition. 33

The challenge, as Yúdice says, is for those persons who are currently racialized as white to claim responsibility for the social capital that “they assume with their [white] identity.” 34 This task may be especially challenging for white youths and older white workers who, due to class-based vulnerabilities and disempowerment, find themselves torn between, on the one hand, supporting an anti-racist and redistributive progressive agenda and, on the other hand, rallying behind conservative, colorblind (if not racist) agendas that offer largely “racial” and cultural explanations for structural, political economic problems. 35 For whites, this rearticulation would mean that, as Yúdice says,

the basis for their relative privilege must be uncovered and replaced with an understanding of how life chances have diminished under free-market policies not only for people of color but for themselves too. It must be demonstrated that their opportunities to get ahead in the world are diminished not because of affirmative action but rather because of the abandonment of the social contract . . . [and] the logic of late capitalism. 36

II. TOWARDS A CRITICAL THEORY OF RACIALIZED IDENTITY

The kind of deconstructive critical rearticulation of whiteness that I have just sketched is a far cry from proprietary investments in whiteness. It regards whiteness as a problematic political construction and makes no attempt to rehabilitate either whiteness or “white culture.” At the same time, it calls on whites to avow responsibility for the

31 Id. at 18.
32 Id. at 19–20.
33 See generally Yúdice, supra note 28; and Howard Winant, Whiteness at Century’s End, in THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF WHITENESS (Matt Wray ed., forthcoming).
34 Yúdice, supra note 28, at 275.
35 See Lipsitz, supra note 18, at 16–19.
36 Yúdice, supra note 28, at 275.
social capital that accrues to them as whites, even while many of them may face considerable insecurities and diminished life chances based on their class status. Consequently, it is involves a conception of democratic political identity and agency that is similar to but slightly different than Olson’s notion of an abolitionist personality.

My alternative is rooted in a critical theory of racialized identity that features a somewhat different account than Olson presents of the interplay between power and culture in the shaping of racialized identities. It comprehends racialized identity primarily as a manifestation of unequal power between groups, but also, in part, as a source of self-definition and affiliation. Therefore, it calls upon us to endorse only those cultural manifestations of racialized identity that can be coherently combined with a commitment to the moral equality of all persons. With respect to whiteness, then, a critical theory of racialized identity affirms Olson’s basic point: the intrinsically antidemocratic character of white racialized identity means that it must be deconstructed, resisted, and dismantled rather than positively affirmed. Yet in contrast to Olson’s abolitionist approach, a critical theory of racialized identity demands a more ambivalent engagement with all modes of racialized identification, including oppositional identities. This would involve not only a critique of how white people’s possessive investments in whiteness perpetuate racialized and class-based inequalities, but also a critical (though by no means merely negative) approach to various assertions of blackness, such as Olson’s suggestion that “democracy should aspire to blackness.”

Olson, for his part, recommends that we look to Black culture as a source of core values for a new anti-racist democratic identity. Black culture, he notes, has been the most prominent oppositional culture that has “emerged within and against white supremacy” to “imagin[e] a world beyond it.” Drawing on the historian V.P. Franklin, Olson goes on to assert that “the core values of the African American experience are self-determination, freedom, resistance, and education.”

Without a doubt, these values are crucial for any truly democratic forms of identity and social transformation. It is problematic, however, to claim that these are core democratic values exclusively for Black culture, just as it would be erroneous to claim these are white Anglo-Saxon values. Those of us who are committed to advancing an emancipatory struggle for freedom, resistance, democracy, self-determination, education, and equality have much to learn from such Black Atlantic theorists as Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. Du Bois, Ida B. Wells, Richard Wright, and the Combahee River Collective. Yet we also have much to learn on these topics from such white, European (and Eurocentric) thinkers as Mill, Marx, and Simone de Beauvoir.

37 Olson, supra note 4, at 20. For related critical engagements with Black culture, see generally PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC: MODERNITY AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS (1993); Angela Y. Davis, Black Nationalism: The Sixties and the Nineties, in BLACK POPULAR CULTURE, A PROJECT BY MICHELE WALLACE (Gina Dent ed., 1992); Gooding-Williams, supra note 10.

38 Olson, supra note 4 at 19.

39 Id.

40 In the United States during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, prevailing racial discourse commonly maintained that these values were indeed distinctive to white Anglo-Saxons! See THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1963).

41 Insofar as the latter thinkers contribute culturally to this emancipatory democratic project, they
Finally, a critical theory of racialized identity offers a couple of further insights for thinking about the emancipatory contributions of Black culture. First, it recognizes that Black culture does indeed contain unique contributions for elaborating anti-racist and democratic identities and institutions. These contributions lay not so much in a distinctive set of ideals and values, but rather in a unique history of resistance and, as Olson suggests, in profound insights about how we might achieve the ideals of freedom, resistance, self-determination, education, and equality in a fully inclusive and substantively democratic way. Indispensable contributions in this vein include Frederick Douglass’s critique of how US racism betrayed the promises of the Declaration of Independence, W.E.B. Du Bois’s analysis of the “wages of whiteness,” James Baldwin’s account of the racialized character of the “American Dream,” the Black Power Movement’s insistence that freedom requires empowerment, and the Combahee River Collective’s path breaking discussion of interlocking forms of oppression rooted in “race,” class, gender, and sexuality. Second, a critical theory of racialized identity addresses the ways in which Black culture as well as white culture includes some narrow, chauvinistic elements that must be acknowledged and critically engaged rather than simply endorsed.

In sum, Olson has given us a compelling critique of “colorblind” and multicultural approaches to racialized injustice in the United States. I contend, however, that if our goal is to cultivate anti-racist democratic identities and institutions, a critical theory of racialized identity offers some advantages over his notion of an abolitionist personality. In particular, it provides a more nuanced approach to the cultural manifestations of racialized identity.

are not contributing to anything recognizable as “white culture.”

42 See Olson, supra note 4, at 19.


44 See generally Gilroy, supra note 10; Paul Gilroy, Black Fascism, 81/82 TRANSITION AN INT’L REV. (2000) 70. Let me be clear: I agree with Olson that white culture as white culture is nothing other than an racially exclusionary set of ideas and practices. My point here is that there is no univocal and unequivocally emancipatory Black culture.